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Causal Loops and the Independence 
of Causal Facts 
Phil Dowett 
University of Tasmania 
According to Hugh Mellor in Real Time II (1998, Ch. 12), assuming the logical inde- 
pendence of causal facts and the 'law of large numbers', causal loops are impossible 
because if they were possible they would produce inconsistent sets of frequencies. I 
clarify the argument, and argue that it would be preferable to abandon the relevant 
independence assumption in the case of causal loops. 
1. Mellor's Argument Against the Possibility of Causal Loops. Suppose we 
have a causal loop between particular events (or facts about particulars) 
P and Q; i.e., P causes Q and Q causes P. According to Mellor P causes 
Q only if chpQ = q and ch_pQ = q' exist; and Q causes P only if the 
following chances exist: chQP = p and ch-QP = p', where 'chQP' is read 
as 'the chance that Q gives P'. Mellor argues that such a scenario produces 
contradictions, and therefore the possibility of such loops should be re- 
jected (1998, Ch. 12). His argument utilizes two important assumptions. 
Mellor's first key assumption is Independence, i.e., that causal facts are 
logically independent of each other. Since the fact that P causes Q is log- 
ically independent of what causes P and what Q causes, if the P-Q loop is 
possible, then all combinations of individually possible values for p, p', q, 
q' should be possible, apart from the requirement that p > p' and q > q'. 
Mellor's second key assumption we may call the Frequency Condition. 
Chances are connected to frequencies by laws of large numbers. The rela- 
tive frequency of Q-type events in partitions of P-type events f(Q I P) in 
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the same circumstances should be very close to q in a large enough sample, 
in the sense that "as [the number of trials] n increases without limit, f,'s 
chance of differing from q by less than a given amount, however small, 
while it will never be 1, will eventually differ from 1 by less than any given 
amount, however small" (Mellor 1998, 133). So, in large samples, 
f(QIP) - chpQ = q 
f(Q I -P) ch,pQ = q' 
f(PIQ) chP=p 
f(PI -Q) chQP=p'. (1) 
From this it follows (see Appendix 1) that, in large samples, we have the 
following approximations of the number of Q-type events N(Q), of P-type 
events N(P), and likewise for the number of times P and Q don't occur: 
N(Q) q N(P) + q' N(-P) (4a) 
N(P) p N(Q) + p' N(-Q) (4b) 
N(~Q) (1 - q)N(P) +(1 - q')N(~P) (4c) 
N(~P) (1 - p)N(Q) + (1 - p')N(~Q). (4d) 
Mellor considers a sample of 20 million (M) cases of individuals with the 
chances q, q', p, p'. The chances q and q' are logically independent (pro- 
vided q > q'); suppose q = 0.6 and q' = 0.2. Suppose also that the number 
of P, N(P) = N(-P) = 10M; i.e., f(P) = f(-P) = 1/2. Then, by (4a) 
and (4c) N(Q) - 8M and N(-Q) = 12M. But p and p' are independent 
of q and q'. So we can take any values, say p = 0.5, p' = 0.25. Then, by 
(4b) and (4d) N(P) = 7M and N(-P) = 13M. This contradicts the initial 
frequencies. Since the possibility of such a loop entails the compatibility 
of any set of values for q, q', p, p' given the independence of causal facts 
and the Frequency Condition (1), the independence of causal facts and 
the Frequency Condition together entail that such a loop is not possible. 
It will be helpful to have an example. (Here P and Q are not direct 
causes as in Mellor's loop, but the example should be instructive all the 
same.) Suppose we have a wormhole whose mouth opens sporadically, 
and which when open allows a photon to pass through and to reappear 
from the other end a short time earlier. Suppose that we consider cases 
where a certain kind of atom, which can absorb and radiate photons, is 
put in the vacinity of the wormhole when it is open. Let t2 be the small 
time segment for which the wormhole mouth is open, and t, a small time 
segment some time before t2 during which a photon could appear from 
the wormhole. 
Take P to be the absorption of a photon by the atom at t,, and Q to 
be the emission of a photon by the atom at t2. Suppose we have 20M cases 
where a wormhole is open in the presence of such an atom. Assume we 
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have 10M cases where a photon is absorbed at tl, and 10M where one is 
not. Suppose the chance that an atom which has absorbed a photon at t, 
will emit a photon at t2 is chpQ = q = 0.6, and the chance that it will 
emit at t2 when it hasn't absorbed a photon at t, is ch-pQ = q' = 0.2; 
and that the chance that the atom will absorb a photon at t, when it emits 
one at t2 is chQP = p = 0.5, and finally, the chance that it will absorb at 
t, when it hasn't emitted a photon at t2 is ch_QP = p' = 0.25. Then, by 
the above reasoning, it will follow that there are 7M cases where a photon 
is absorbed at t, and 13M cases where one is not, contradicting the original 
initial frequency according to which a photon was absorbed in half the 
cases. 
So, to recap the argument, assuming (1) the independence of causal 
facts and thence of the chances in a loop and (2) the Frequency Condition, 
it follows that the possibility of causal loops entails inconsistent frequen- 
cies. Therefore causal loops are not possible. 
2. Revised Formulation. However, the argument of the last section, as for- 
mulated, is invalid-the assumptions as stated do not entail a contradic- 
tion. In fact we need a stronger independence condition to derive a con- 
tradiction. Recall that the Independence assumption allowed us to choose 
any set of chances p, p', q, q'. But this alone will not give a contradiction, 
because we can show that for any set of chances in a loop, there is a unique 
value for the 'initial' frequency which does not yield contradictory fre- 
quencies (this result was first given in Berkovitz 2001; for my proof see 
Appendix 2). To gain a contradiction we must also assume that for a given 
set of four chances, we can set any initial frequency. In fact our derivation 
of the contradiction in the previous section does assume this. 
Firstly, (4a)-(4d) entail (5a) and (5b) (see Appendix 2): 
N(Q)/N(-Q) (p'q + q' - p'q')/(1 - pq - q' + pq') (5a) 
N(P)/N(-P) (pq' + p' - p'q')/(1 - pq - p' + p'q). (5b) 
In other words, the initial and final frequencies in a loop are each a direct 
function of the set of four chances p, p', q, q'. For any set of chances there 
is a unique value forf(P) and a unique value forf(Q). Clearly, to choose 
a different value of the initial frequency will lead to a contradiction. 
Given Mellor's choice of four chances, {q = 0.6, q' = 0.2, p = 0.5, 
p' = 0.25}, (5a) and (5b) entail that N(Q)/N(-Q) = N(P)/N(-P) = 1/2. 
Equivalently, f(P) = f(Q) = 1/3. We can get consistency by taking 
N(P, -P) = (O1M, 20M), from which it follows from the four chances 
and the frequency condition that N(Q, -Q) = (10M, 20M), which in turn 
entails that N(P, -P) = (10M, 20M), i.e., no contradiction. In other 
words, given these chances, Mellor's choice of initial frequenciesf(P) = 
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f(Q) = 1/2 is not allowed by the laws of large numbers. It is not surprising 
then that it yields a contradiction. 
Alternatively, a choice of chances q and q' together with initial fre- 
quencies f(P) and f(-P) fixes the chances p and p'. Given Mellor's 
choices, these chances are constrained in large sequences as follows: 
8M(1 - p) + 12M(1 - p') 10OM (6) 
which, together with the requirement that if Q causes P then p > p', entails 
the restriction that p > 1/2, contrary to Mellor's assumption. 
So the argument that the independence of the four chances together 
with the frequency condition gives a contradiction in the case of loops is 
invalid. However, we can strengthen the independence condition thus: 
Input-Independence Condition: For any set of chances in a loop, we 
are free to choose any initial frequency. 
Input-Independence and the Frequency Condition together entail con- 
tradictions in loops. This is what Mellor's argument achieves, as shown 
in the previous section. This argument is valid, but it raises the question, 
why should we take the Input-Independence Condition to be at all plau- 
sible in the case of loops? Why not simply reject it, rather than the pos- 
sibility of loops? 
3. Independence of Initial Frequencies Without Loops. First, some com- 
ments about Input-Independence in the linear case. Consider a 'normal' 
case of causation, where P causes Q, and where chpQ = q = 0.6 and 
ch-pQ = q' = 0.2. Here the Input-Independence assumption is plausible. 
The Frequency Condition entails that (4a) applies: 
N(Q) q N(P) + q' N(-P) (4a) 
so that we see clearly how the output frequency depends logically on the 
chances and the input frequency. 
However, logically, for a given pair of chances either input frequencies 
or output frequencies (but not both) can be taken as independent. Since 
N(P) + N(-P) = N(Q) + N(-Q), (4a) entails that: 
N(P) {(1 - q')/(q - q')} N(Q) - {(q')/(q - q')} N(-Q). (6) 
In other words, the input frequency depends logically on the two 
chances and the output frequency. For q = 0.6 and q' = 0.2, if we take 
the output frequency to be N(Q, -Q) = (8M, 12M), then (6) gives us 
N(P, -P) = (10M, 10M). 
Normally, of course, we take the inputs as independent and the outputs 
as dependent (Hausman 1998). But as we have just seen, this is not re- 
quired logically. The logical requirement is that either inputs or outputs 
S92 
This content downloaded from 130.102.158.18 on Fri, 20 Nov 2015 00:40:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CAUSAL LOOPS 
(exclusive 'or') are dependent on the chances. So the Input-Independence 
assumption is not a logical requirement. Part of it comes from the further 
assumption that causes rather than effects should be treated as the free 
variables. 
For example, suppose we have our atom without the wormhole, but 
with the same chances for Q, the emission of a photon, contingent on the 
earlier absorption P. We can manipulate P to control Q by controlling the 
circumstances so as to affect the chance of P. So we increase the rate of 
incident photons. This doesn't affect the chances q, q'; by increasingf(P) 
we simply increase f(Q). We don't think we can do the same with the 
output frequencies. We don't think that by changing the output frequency, 
while holding the chances of Q fixed (if we think this is even possible), 
that we can control the input frequencies. Whether this is justified, and if 
so what justifies it, is beyond the scope of this paper (Price 1996). But it 
is not justified by the logic alone. But, of course, there is no question that 
we do follow this practice in normal cases. If smoking causes cancer, then 
we control the cancer by influencing the frequency of smoking, which 
leaves the chances of cancer for smokers and non-smokers untouched. If 
cancer causes weight loss, we don't think we could control cancer by in- 
fluencing the frequency of weight loss. 
Our results also ensure transitivity. Suppose, additionally, that Q causes 
R, again in the absence of the possibility of any loops, and that chQR = 
r = 0.5 and ch_QR = r' = 0.25. We assume, as we did in the case of 
loops, that the circumstances in which Q gives R this chance is essentially 
the same as the circumstances in which P gives Q that chance. 
Sincef(R) depends on r, r', andf(Q), andf(Q) depends on q, q', and 
f(P), it follows thatf(R) depends on r, r', q, q', andf(P). For example, 
for these values of the chances, if N(P, -P) = (O1M, 10M) then by the 
Frequency Condition (4a) it follows that N(R, -R) = (7M, 13M). Alter- 
natively, again, it is also true that f(P) depends on r, r', q, q', and 
f(R). For the same chances, N(R, -R) = (7M, 13M) entails N(P, -P) 
= (10M, 10M). 
4. Independence of 'Initial' Frequencies in Loops. The argument against the 
possibility of loops derives a contradiction from the Frequency Condition 
together with the Input-Independence Condition (that the initial fre- 
quencyf(P) can be set independently of the four chances in the loop). So 
we face a choice: granting the Frequency Condition and the original In- 
dependence assumption (i.e., that C causes E is logically independent of 
what causes C and what E causes), we must reject either the possibility of 
causal loops or the Frequency Condition. In this section I offer a case for 
dropping the Input-Independence Condition for loops, rather than re- 
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jecting the possibility of loops. I argue that in the case of loops we have 
ample reason to abandon the Input-Independence Condition. 
First, there is a prima facie case which exists purely in virtue of the 
logic. As shown in the previous section, in the case of normal causation 
logic allows that having set the chances and granting the Frequency Con- 
dition, we are still free to set initial frequency, providing we haven't set 
the output frequency. However, we have also seen that in the case of loops 
setting the chances logically determines the initial frequency. This in itself 
is a prima facie case for rejecting Input-Independence, unless we can come 
up with a good independent reason for keeping it despite the logic. How- 
ever, as we shall see, the usual reasons for holding Independence seem 
inappropriate in the case of loops. 
Second, given that it is supposed to establish the impossibility of loops, 
for Mellor's argument to work the Input-Independence needs to be nec- 
essarily true (strictly, that necessarily Input or Output-Independence is 
true). How do we prove or disprove that such a claim is necessarily true? 
One way to disprove it is to give a possible consistent case which violates 
it. Well, the consistent-frequency loop case given above is just such a case. 
It is consistent, and it violates both Input and Output-Independence. To 
overcome this Mellor needs to offer an independent argument for the 
necessity of the principle. Again, the burden of proof clearly lies with the 
defender of Input-Independence. 
Mellor's rationale concerns the original Independence principle (that C 
causes E is logically independent of what causes C and what E causes). 
But, as we have seen, this is besides the point. We can accept this principle 
without contradiction, because it does not entail Input-Independence. Are 
there other arguments available? I will now canvas some possible can- 
didates, but argue that they do not give us reason to apply Input- 
Independence to loops. 
One argument for applying Independence to loops might be that, by 
analogy, since we normally take causes as independent and effects as de- 
pendent, and in loops we claim to be dealing with causes and effects, i.e., 
P in our loop is an initial cause, so we should allowf(P) in the loop to be 
a free variable. This is an argument by analogy: as in the linear case, so 
also for loops; input frequencies are free in the linear case, so they should 
be in loops; f(P) is input frequency, therefore it should be free. But it's 
not clear why the reasoning should run this way. After all, P in the loop 
is both a cause and an effect. Why don't we reason: since effects are nor- 
mally taken to be dependent variables, in the loop P is an effect andf(P) 
is an output, so we should treat it as an effect, and not a free variable. 
This seems to be an equally good argument by analogy: Why should we 
want to treat f(P) as if it were like a linear input rather than a linear 
output? Further, the argument by analogy faces the obvious objection that 
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there is a suspiciously relevant-looking point of disanalogy between the 
linear case and loops: precisely that logically in the linear case inputs can 
be treated as free whereas in loops they cannot. 
Another reason we normally take input frequencies to be independent 
is that we can manipulate them to control output frequencies, generally 
leaving the chances unaffected. We control the frequency of cancer by 
influencing the frequency of smoking, which does not affect the chances 
of cancer for smokers or non-smokers. But, (i) in loops we don't have the 
same capacity to manipulate input frequencies, and (ii) even to the extent 
that we do, we can't use it to control output frequency in the normal way. 
One reason we can't manipulate input frequency f(P) in the loop is 
simply that a cause of P in an actual loop is Q. For example, in the worm- 
hole example, if we actually have a particular loop P-Q-P then the photon 
absorbed comes via the wormhole from the future emission by the atom. 
The photon in our actual loop has no history or future. It appears from 
the wormhole, is absorbed by the atom, is emitted by the atom, and dis- 
appears down the wormhole, from where it appears. 
In such a case we do not bring about P by controlling the background 
incidence of photons. So in general, in our example if there are 10M cases 
of P, then 5M of them are caused by Q and 5M of them arise in the absence 
of Q. Supposing that we have control over those cases where P occurs in 
the absence of Q, we still have only limited control over f(P), because 
although we can increase the relative number of P's in the absence of Q, 
this gives us no control over the relative incidence of P-with-Q compared 
to cases where P does not occur. For this reason, in general we cannot 
controlf(P). 
Another argument for applying Input-Independence to loops is a def- 
initional argument. Suppose we assert that the meaning of 'cause' is in 
part 'an event whose frequency is independent of the chances it and its 
absence gives its effect, and of the frequency of the effect'; and the meaning 
of 'effect' is in part 'an event whose frequency is dependent on its chances 
and the frequency of its cause'. Then it will follow that neither P nor Q in 
our loop deserve the label 'cause', or 'effect'. 
But why should we accept such a definition? There may be reasons why 
we should, roughly of the form that if we accept the definition certain 
features of causation would be explained. However, as arguments for ap- 
plying Input-Independence to loops, these reasons beg the question. 
To illustrate, I give one example. The definition explains why the causal 
relation is asymmetric in the logical sense. (Every two-place relation is 
either symmetric, asymmetric, or non-symmetric. Relation Rab is sym- 
metric if Rab entails Rba, asymmetric if Rab entails not-Rba, and non- 
symmetric if it entails neither.) Our definition indeed entails that the sin- 
gular causal relation is asymmetric. But why should we accept that the 
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causal relation is asymmetric? Clearly causation is not symmetric, but is 
it asymmetric or non-symmetric? The only way I know of to determine 
such formal properties of a relation is by inspection of instances. But we 
have a consistent instance of causation where P is the cause and the effect 
of Q. Therefore, even if in most cases causes are not the effects of their 
effects, since there is one case which is, it follows that the causal relation 
is non-symmetric. Thus to suppose that causation is asymmetric in the 
logical sense simply begs the question against loops, so we have no reason 
to accept the definition under consideration. 
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Appendix 1 
From the standard probability calculus we know that the frequencyf(Q) 
of Q type events in given circumstances is given by 
f(Q) = f(QIP)f(P) + f(Ql~P)f(~P) (2a) 
and 
f(P) = f(P Q)f(Q) + f(PI ~Q)f(Q). (2b) 
Also, sincef(-~QP) = 1 - f(QIP),f(-Q IP) = 1 - f(Q IP),f-(PIQ) 
= 1 - f(PIQ), andf(~-PIQ) = 1 - f(PI~Q), we also have, from (2a) 
f(~Q) = [1 -f(QIP)]f(P) + [1 -f(QI~P)lf(~P) (2c) 
and, from (2b) 
f(~P) = [1 - f(PIQ)lf(Q) + [1 - f(PI~Q)]f(-Q). (2d) 
So, in large samples, we have the approximations that: 
f(Q) qf(P) + q' f(~P) (3a) 
f(P) pf(Q) + p' f(~Q) (3b) 
f(-Q) (1 - q)f(P) +(1 - q')f(-P) (3c) 
f(~P) (1 - p)f(Q) + (1 - p')f(~Q). (3d) 
To express this in terms of the number of cases of Q, P, -Q, and -P; since 
f(Q) = N(Q)/{N(Q) + N(-Q)} andf(P) = N(P)/{N(Q) + N(-Q)} (and 
similarly for -Q and -P): 
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N(Q) q N(P) + q' N(-P) (4a) 
N(P) p N(Q) + p' N(-Q) (4b) 
N(~Q) (1 - q)N(P) +(1 - q')N(-P) (4c) 
N(-P) (1 - p)N(Q) + (1 - p')N(-Q). (4d) 
Appendix 2 
The 'initial' and 'final' frequencies in a loop are each a function of the four 
chances p, p', q, q'. To see this, we note firstly that (4a)-(4d) entail (5a) and 
(5b) as follows. Substituting (4b) and (4d) into (4a), 
N(Q) = q[pN(Q) + p'N(-Q)] + q'[(1 - p)N(Q) + (1 - p')N(~Q)] 
= (qp + q' - pq')N(Q) + (qp' + q' - q'p')N(-Q), 
from which we get (5a), and by similar reasoning, (5b): 
N(Q)/N(-Q) (p'q + q' - p'q')/(1 - pq - q' + pq') (5a) 
N(P)/N(-P) ~ (pq' + p' - p'q')/(1 - pq - p' + p'q). (5b) 
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